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Over the past several decades health-care
costs have increased substantially, and the share
of the population with insurance coverage has
decreased. Relative to GDP, medical care today
accounts for 75 percent more of the economy
than it did in 1980. At the same time, the share
of the non-elderly population that is uninsured
has increased by roughly 4 percentage points
since 1987. To what extent is the increase in the
cost of health insurance responsible for the de-
cline in coverage?
Individuals will purchase coverage if the util-
ity of being insured exceeds that of being unin-
sured. Textbook economic theory suggests that
rising medical expenditures ought to increase
the utility of coverage because insurance miti-
gates risk. If the variability of spending rises as
medical care costs increase, insurance becomes
more valuable (Charles Phelps, 1997).
1 The ris-
ing demand for pharmaceutical coverage fol-
lowing the rise in spending on pharmaceuticals
is consistent with this model. In the textbook
model, rising costs would be associated with
falling coverage only if the cost increases were
driven by increased administrative loads. Em-
pirically, though, most medical spending is a
result of increased quantities of care received,
owing to technological changes in medicine, not
greater administrative burden (Cutler and Mark
McClellan, 2001).
There are two extensions to the textbook
model that can help explain the inverse relation-
ship between premiums and insurance cover-
age. The ﬁrst is the hypothesis that the value of
new services is not sufﬁciently high to justify
their costs, and thus some people rationally de-
cline coverage when costs increase.
2 Of course,
if consumers had the option, they would ex-
clude unvalued care from the insurance policy,
but determining which care is valuable and
which is not may be difﬁcult, and contracting
imperfections may make it difﬁcult for individ-
uals to purchase a plan that limits access to
particular services.
One type of unvalued care is traditional moral
hazard: services are provided because of insur-
ance but are worth less than they cost. Cutler
(2004) shows that increased medical spend-
ing overall has bought care that is more than
worth its value. But that does not imply that the
differential growth of service use in some areas
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1 This need not be true in all contexts; the mean of
spending could increase while the spread narrows. How-
ever, if technology increases spending proportionately at
each point in the distribution, or disproportionately affects
spending for the very sick, greater spending would be as-
sociated with greater variance.
2 Rising quantities of care function, in essence, as an
increase in administrative loads.
209of the country relative to other areas is purchas-
ing services of high value. It may be that high-
cost growth areas are disproportionately buying
care with little marginal value.
A more subtle story about the value of care
concerns the breakdown of risk pooling. Insur-
ance is generally not priced at the individual
level. Most insurance is bought in employment
groups. Although there may be a group-speciﬁc
wage offset associated with coverage (Louise
Sheiner, 1997; Mark V. Pauly and Bradley Her-
ring, 1999), it is likely that relatively healthy
groups of individuals would experience a
greater increase in premiums, compared to the
value they receive, relative to less healthy indi-
viduals. As a result, the healthy could decide to
drop coverage as technological change im-
proves care for the sick. Why should a relatively
healthy 30-year-old pay 10 percent more each
year for insurance if most of the costs are for
services that are very unlikely to be used? The
result is the potential for market unraveling.
The second extension to the textbook model
focuses on the utility of being uninsured, stress-
ing the availability of charity care for the unin-
sured as a mechanism for avoiding the increased
costs of coverage (Kevin Rask and Kimberly
Rask, 2000; Herring, 2001). People who are
uninsured do not pay for all medical care out-
of-pocket. Rather, much of the care is “uncom-
pensated,” written off by the provider as bad
debt or charity care. While evidence suggests
that a lack of coverage is associated with worse
health outcomes (Institute of Medicine, 2002),
the incremental value of the access to care as-
sociated with coverage may not be rising as
rapidly as costs over time if the new technology
is at least partly integrated into charity care. We
examine these possible explanations for the re-
lationship between premiums and coverage in
the next sections of the paper.
I. Medical Costs and Insurance Coverage
To examine the factors predicting changes in
insurance coverage, we use data on coverage in
different metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
at the beginning and end of the 1990s.
3 We
create two cohorts of non-elderly individuals
from the Current Population Survey (CPS): one
cohort from 1988–1990 and the second from
1997–1999. Respondents are divided into health
insurance units (HIUs), the typical unit in which
insurance is purchased. The CPS provides a rich
array of HIU and market-level variables that we
control for, including basic demographics, in-
come, employment characteristics, and MSA
characteristics such as the overall demographic
composition. As discussed below, we use age as
a proxy for health status.
We measure health insurance premiums us-
ing premium data from the Health Insurance
Association of America and the Kaiser Family
Foundation/Health Research and Educational
Trust Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health
Beneﬁts (KPMG Survey, 1988, 1989, 1998; and
Kaiser Family Foundation, 1999). Surveys are
pooled from 1988 and 1989 for the early years
and 1998 and 1999 for the later years. To purge
the premium data of differences in beneﬁt de-
sign, we regress premiums on plan type,
whether an employer offers multiple plans, and
interactions of these variables with each other
and year dummies; cost-sharing parameters
such as deductible, coinsurance, and copay
amounts; dummy variables for service cover-
age, including coverage for prescription drugs,
outpatient mental-health beneﬁts, inpatient
mental-health beneﬁts, and maternity beneﬁts;
ﬁrm size and industry dummies; and MSA dum-
mies and their interaction with years. The coef-
ﬁcients on MSA dummies in this regression
give adjusted premium estimates at the MSA
level.
4 Premiums have increased substantially
over time. From the late 1980s to the late 1990s,
the cost of a standard insurance policy for an
individual increased by $818 (in 1999 dollars).
Clearly, premium changes may be endoge-
nous to changes in insurance coverage, and
measurement error in the premium data can bias
the estimates. Yet in Chernew et al. (2005) we
report that in models for any insurance cover-
age, instrumental-variables models using per
capita MSA level Medicare Part B spending and
state-level personal spending for the non-elderly
as instruments for premiums were even a bit
3 See Chernew et al. (2004) for discussion of the data and
its construction.
4 The coefﬁcients from this regression indicate that more
generous beneﬁts led to greater premiums; the R
2 from this
regression was 0.26. The resulting premium estimates are
quite reasonable: the correlation between adjusted premi-
ums and Medicare Part B spending at the MSA level is 0.47.
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(presumably because of measurement error).
We measure charity-care availability as the
number of public and teaching hospital beds per
capita, from American Hospital Association da-
ta.
5 These are the hospitals that provide much of
charity care in the United States (Joyce Mann et
al., 1997). We measure these variables only in
1990 to minimize reverse causality issues that
may arise because these measures could be af-
fected by insurance, rather than the reverse. The
average area had 0.0013 public and teaching
hospital beds per capita in 1990. We also in-
clude the share of children eligible for Medic-
aid, following Cutler and Jonathan Gruber
(1996). A lengthy literature has focused on pub-
lic insurance crowd-out, ﬁnding signiﬁcant ev-
idence that Medicaid eligibility reduces private
coverage.
We control for several other variables sug-
gested in the literature that might lead to de-
creased levels of insurance. Traditional theories
of insurance have focused on the tax price of
insurance: marginal tax rate reductions over the
past two decades have lowered the tax subsidy
to health insurance purchases, and thus possibly
led to reduced coverage. We measure the tax
subsidy for health insurance along the lines of
Gruber (2001). We also control for state regu-
lations that could affect coverage, speciﬁcally
whether a state has passed insurance rating re-
forms or enacted guaranteed issue for the small-
group health insurance market (Kosali Simon,
2000). Finally, some have hypothesized that a
greater share of working women should lead to
lower insurance coverage, as employers provide
less generous beneﬁts in the hope of encourag-
ing employees to take up coverage elsewhere
(David Dranove et al., 2000; Henry S. Farber
and Helen Levy, 2000).
Estimates from a model of coverage without
a premium  charity-care interaction suggest
that a $1,000 increase in premiums reduces the
propensity to purchase private coverage by 2.7
percentage points (standard error  0.007).
6
The premium coefﬁcient is statistically signiﬁ-
cantly different from zero. Further, it is large.
The $818 per person increase in the cost of a
single policy over the past decade can account
for about two-thirds of the total 3.3-percentage-
point reduction in private insurance coverage
over the time period.
The estimates on the other covariates are
generally consistent with the existing literature
(results available from the authors upon re-
quest). A higher tax price discourages private
coverage. Individuals in markets with a larger
share of working women and with greater Med-
icaid generosity or charity-care providers are
less likely to have private coverage, consistent
with the public health insurance crowd-out
literature.
II. Charity Care and Administrative Loads
We examine the reasons why increased pre-
miums affect insurance coverage in several
ways. To explore the charity-care explanation,
we interact the measure of public and teaching
hospital availability with premiums.
7 The charity-
care explanation suggests that premiums should
have a larger effect on coverage when charity
care is more readily available. In this regression,
the coefﬁcients on premiums and their interac-
tion with charity care are 0.019 (SE  0.008)
and 13.10 (SE  5.81), respectively. The
results are consistent with the theory: the re-
sponsiveness to private coverage from premi-
ums is nearly twice as great at the mean value of
charity care, as compared to if charity care is
not available. Put another way, about half of the
impact of rising premiums on insurance cover-
age is a result of the availability of charity care.
The charity-care explanation should be more
important for groups with low income and as-
sets, since these groups cannot contribute as
much of their own funds to paying for care. The
magnitudes of the responsiveness to premiums
are depicted in Figure 1 for subgroups by
age, education, and income based on separate
5 We include this variable as an interaction with time
period, to examine whether the effect of charity-care avail-
ability changes over time.
6 We use linear probability models throughout the paper
for ease of interpretation, and to avoid issues of different
magnitudes of the effect based on the baseline characteris-
tics (Chunrong Ai and Edward C. Norton, 2003). Nonlinear
estimation methods such as probit give similar results with
a somewhat higher effect of premiums on coverage de-
clines. The standard errors in all cases are adjusted for
intra-MSA correlation.
7 We also estimated the interaction between premiums
and Medicaid eligibility. We do not ﬁnd a greater response
to premiums in areas with greater Medicaid eligibility.
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again consistent with the theory. The impact of
premiums themselves (and of the charity-care
interaction) is much greater for less-educated
(full results available from the authors upon
request) and lower-income populations.
8 In-
deed, we ﬁnd no evidence that premium in-
creases reduce coverage among the group with
some college or more education, or those with
incomes above $30,000 per year.
The risk-pooling explanation suggests look-
ing at the response by health status: increased
premiums should have a greater impact for the
healthy than for the less healthy. We proxy for
health status using age: people aged 18–25 are
on average much healthier than those aged 50–
64. The risk-pooling explanation also ﬁnds em-
pirical support. Premium increases substantially
reduce coverage among the healthier population
and have no impact on coverage among the
older population. The decline in coverage for
the healthy is particularly true in areas where
charity care is more readily available, suggest-
ing an interaction between our risk-pooling and
charity-care theories.
While this evidence is consistent with the
risk-pooling explanation, it might also be con-
sistent with other theories, including models
where the young view new services as less
valuable than the old, or where the young are
less risk-averse than the old. We would need
direct measures of perceived value and of risk
aversion to differentiate among all these
theories.
The fact that premiums have no impact on
coverage for older, better educated, and higher-
income populations is consistent with the idea
that there is no pure moral hazard in rising
health-care costs—that is, the additional care
bought is clinically useful. However, the impact
of the tax price, a measure of pure load, is also
not very salient in the older population, suggest-
ing that this group is very risk-averse and per-
ceives the value of coverage relative to relying
on charity care to be substantial.
III. Summary
The evidence is clear that rising health-insur-
ance costs lead to signiﬁcant reductions in in-
surance coverage—as much as two-thirds of the
overall decline in coverage in the 1990s. We
estimate that up to half of this response to
higher costs is related to the availability of
charity care. This estimate is rough because our
estimates of the availability of charity care are
based solely on the availability of beds in public
and teaching hospitals. Moreover, our charity-
care measure, which incorporates availability of
beds in teaching hospitals, could reﬂect greater
moral hazard over time. Nevertheless, the mod-
8 The same is true about the availability of Medicaid.
TABLE 1—LINEAR PROBABILITY MODELS EXPLAINING
PRIVATE HEALTH-INSURANCE COVERAGE
Income $30,000 $30,000
Premiums
a 0.038** 0.013
(0.014) (0.008)
Charity-care premium
† 24.24* 3.65
(10.71) (4.83)
Age 18–25 50–64
Premiums
a 0.033
† 0.005
(0.017) (0.014)
Charity care premium
† 28.85* 3.07
(11.14) (11.28)
Notes: Each set of coefﬁcients represents a separate regres-
sion. All models include MSA ﬁxed effects and control for
individual demographics as well as the level of charity care,
tax price, state insurance reforms, Medicaid generosity,
percentage working women, and market-level demograph-
ics such as percentage foreign born, MSA unemployment,
mean MSA family income, percentage elderly, and percent-
age nonwhite. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
a Thousands of dollars.
† Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10-percent level.
* Statistically signiﬁcant at the 5-percent level.
** Statistically signiﬁcant at the 1-percent level.
FIGURE 1. IMPACT OF PREMIUMS ON COVERAGE:T HE
EFFECTS OF CHARITY CARE
Notes: The vertical axis is the percentage-point decline in
coverage per $1,000 increase in premium.
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of beds in facilities that are relied upon for
charity care increases the sensitivity of coverage
to rising premiums. By providing access for the
uninsured, charity-care providers inadvertently
create the conditions for crowding out of private
health insurance.
We suspect that the remaining impact of pre-
miums on coverage is due to diminished utility of
coverage associated with rising premiums, partic-
ularly for the young and for low income individ-
uals. The evidence we present is consistent with
this, although not deﬁnitive. Of particular impor-
tance may be the pooling of high- and low-risk
enrollees, which leads to identiﬁable transfers
from the healthy to the sick. As medical costs
increase, the size of these transfers rises, and the
willingness of the healthy to make them declines.
The new era of rising medical spending we
have recently entered could have a major impact
on private insurance coverage. Moreover, the
decline in coverage caused by rising premiums
will place a greater burden on charity-care pro-
viders. Though important in a time of declining
coverage, bolstering the strained charity-care
system may further exacerbate the decline in
coverage, posing a policy dilemma in respond-
ing to increases in the uninsured population.
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